We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profitmaximizing auction design literature as it requires no probabilistic assumptions on buyers' valuations and employs the framework of competitive analysis. Our objective is to optimize the worst-case performance of an auction, measured by the ratio between a given benchmark and revenue generated by the auction.
INTRODUCTION
A central question in auction theory is to design optimal truthful auctions that maximize the revenue of the auctioneer. A truthful auction must be incentive compatible with the selfish behavior of bidders and encourage them to reveal their private information truthfully. In the classic singleparameter setting, the auctioneer sells multiple copies of an item to n unit-demand bidders, each bidder having a private value vi for the item. The revenue maximization problem in economics is traditionally analyzed in the Bayesian framework. The seminal Myerson's auction [24] provides an optimal design that extracts the maximum expected revenue for a given distribution of values.
While Myerson's auction gives an optimal design in the Bayesian framework, in many scenarios determining or estimating the prior distribution in advance is impossible. Without prior information on the distribution, how should an auction be designed? The auctioneer not being certain about the prior distribution is likely to resort to truthful auctions that generate a good revenue on every possible instance of bidders' valuations. We therefore employ the worst-case competitive analysis, which characterizes the worst-case performance of an auction across all possible bidders' valuations. We follow the framework summarized in [14] where a truthful auction is required to generate a profit comparable to the value of a certain economically meaningful benchmark on every input of values. The motivation of this framework comes from the analysis of on-line algorithms, where the performance of an on-line algorithm, which is unaware of the future, is measured in terms of the performance of the optimal off-line algorithm that knows the future. The assumption that an on-line algorithm does not know the future in advance corresponds to the assumption that an auction does not know the bidders' valuations in advance. How well an auction can perform in the worst-case? We will answer this question in the present paper.
A particularly interesting single-parameter setting is digital goods auctions in which the number of units for sale is unlimited or is greater than or equal to the number of bidders. Digital goods auctions are motivated by the applications of selling digital goods like downloadable software on the Internet or pay-per-view television where there is a negligible cost for producing a copy of the item. The design of the optimal Bayesian auction for digital goods is trivial: given a prior distribution of values, one may independently offer each bidder a fixed price pi tailored to the value's distribution vi so as to maximize the expected revenue pi · Pr[vi ≥ pi]. From the worst-case perspective, digital goods auctions attracted considerable attention over the last decade [15, 10, 12, 13, 19, 9, 2, 21] . However, the optimal design was still unknown. The question about designing optimal digital goods auctions remained widely open and is fundamental to our understanding of the optimal competitive auction design in the general single-parameter setting.
Formally, in the competitive analysis framework, given a benchmark function f (·), the competitive ratio (with respect to f (·)) of a truthful auction A is defined as maxv f (v) E[A(v)] , where E[A(v)] is the expected revenue of the auction A on valuation vector v = (v1, . . . , vn). The objective is to design an auction that minimizes the competitive ratio with respect to a given benchmark.
We note that a number of functions can serve as meaningful benchmarks and that they may have different optimal competitive ratios. Such flexibility in the choice of a target benchmark function may prove to be helpful for modeling different objectives of the auctioneer. Conversely, it may allow us to make meaningful conclusions and prescriptions about target benchmarks. However, most of the work done along the line of competitive analysis in algorithmic game theory [25] is devoted to the competitive analysis of a wellmotivated but fixed concrete benchmark function. Namely, while there are basic guidelines for choosing a good benchmark function (e.g., the benchmark should have a strong economic motivation and should match the performance of the optimal auction as closely as possible), there are no formal criteria for distinguishing different benchmarks. In this paper, instead of justifying what a good benchmark is, we focus on the intrinsic relation between benchmarks and their corresponding competitive ratios. We give a complete characterization for almost all possible benchmark functions. Theorem 1. (Characterization) For any non-negative and monotonically increasing function f (·), there is a truthful digital goods auction that achieves a competitive ratio of λ with respect to f (·) if and only if ∫
where S is any upward closed set in the support of valuation vectors, S ↓ i is the projection of S along the i-th coordinate,
. . , vn). The fact that the weight function w(v) = ∏ i 1/v 2 i appears in the above theorem is not a coincidence. The corresponding single-parameter distribution with the density function w(vi) = 1/v 2 i for vi ∈ [1, ∞) is a common tool to provide bounds on the performance of auctions. It is called equalrevenue distribution, as it enjoys a remarkable property that if the value of a bidder i is drawn from this distribution, then any fixed price pi offered to i generates the same expected revenue pi · Pr[vi ≥ pi] = 1. In particular, the product w(v) of independent equal-revenue distributions w(vi) was used in [13] to obtain the best known lower bounds on the competitive ratios of digital goods auctions; it has also been used in the auction analysis of other models, e.g., in [17] .
As we know from Yao's minimax principle, for any benchmark function f (·), there is a distribution of instances such that on average for that distribution no truthful auction can beat the worst-case competitive ratio with respect to f (·). The inequality (1) in the theorem states that the equal revenue distribution is indeed the worst-case distribution to estimate the competitive ratio of an auction. In other words, in the context of digital goods auctions, the worst-case distribution can be described only by its support, and the actual density of the distribution is given by the equal-revenue distribution. The theorem gives a sufficient and necessary condition for a benchmark f (·) to admit a competitive ratio of λ. It implies that the optimal competitive ratio with respect to f (·) is the smallest value of λ for which the inequality (1) holds. The theorem indicates that all benchmarks and their competitive ratios are tied to the equal revenue distribution: it is the worst distribution not only for the benchmark considered in [13] but also for all monotone benchmarks.
We note that our characterization is provided by the set of inequalities (1) that only involves a function f (·) and a ratio λ, but does not describe an actual auction. This is similar in spirit to the characterization of truthfully implementable allocation functions, where an allocation function is truthfully implementable if there exists a payment function that makes the allocation function truthful. To characterize a truthfully implementable allocation function, one uses a set of inequalities such as weak-monotonicity [26, 6, 3] that only specifies an allocation function but says nothing about payments. Hence, without describing any payment function, one can determine whether there is a truthful auction with a specified allocation. Our characterization of benchmarks with a given competitive ratio shares a similar philosophy: the condition determines whether there exists a truthful auction with a certain completive ratio with respect to f (·), but does not explicitly describe the auction.
The characterization theorem provides us with a powerful tool to analyze the optimal competitive ratios of auctions for different benchmarks. We first consider the most wellstudied benchmark F (2) introduced in [15] , which is defined as the maximum revenue achieved in an envy-free allocation provided that at least two bidders receive the item. We next study another natural benchmark, denoted by maxV, which is defined as the maximal revenue of the k-item Vickrey auction across all possible values of k. We have the following results on the optimal competitive ratios for these two benchmarks.
Theorem 2. There are truthful digital goods auctions that achieve the optimal competitive ratios of λn and γn for any n ≥ 2 with respect to the benchmarks F (2) and maxV, respectively, where
It was shown in [13] that λn gives a lower bound on the competitive ratio of any auction with respect to F (2) for any n ≥ 2. These lower bounds were obtained by calculating the expected value of the benchmark F (2) (v) when v is drawn from the equal revenue distribution. In particular, λ2 = 2, λ3 = 13/6, and in general, {λn} ∞ n=1 is an increasing sequence with a limit of roughly 2.42. Goldberg et al. [13] conjectured that the lower bounds given by {λn} are tight. Indeed, for n = 2 bidders, the second price auction gives a matching competitive ratio of λ2; for n = 3 bidders, [19] gave a sophisticated auction with a competitive ratio that matches the lower bound of λ3. These are the only cases for which optimal competitive auctions were known. Our result confirms the conjecture of [13] and settles the long standing open problem of designing optimal digital goods auctions with respect to the benchmark F (2) .
For the benchmark maxV, we calculate the expected value of maxV(v) when v is drawn from the equal revenue distribution, and derive a sequence of optimal competitive ratios γn for each number n of bidders in the auction. We note that γ2 = 1, γ3 = 5/4, and {γn} ∞ n=1 is an increasing sequence with the limit of e − 1 as n approaches infinity.
Finally, as another application of the characterization theorem, we consider optimal competitive auctions for the multiunit limited supply setting where there is an item with k units of supply for sale to n unit-demand bidders. It was observed in [14] that there is a competitive ratio preserving reduction from unlimited supply to limited supply. Namely, given a digital goods auction with a competitive ratio λ with respect to F (2) for k bidders, one can construct a truthful auction for n bidders with the same competitive ratio λ with respect to F (2,k) (where F (2,k) is the optimal fixed price revenue provided that at least 2 and at most k bidders receive the item). Our analysis continues to hold for those benchmarks that only depend on the k highest values, and thus, gives optimal competitive auctions in the competitive analysis framework.
Related Work
The study of competitive digital goods auctions was coined by Goldberg et al. [15] , where the authors introduced the random sampling optimal price auction and showed that it has a constant competitive ratio with respect to F (2) . Later on the competitive ratio of the auction was shown to be 15 and 4.68, by Feige et al. [9] and Alaei et al. [2] , respectively. Since the pioneer work of [15] , a sequence of work has been devoted to design auctions with improved competitive ratios: the random sampling cost sharing auction [10] with ratio 4; the consensus revenue estimate auction [12] with ratio 3.39; the aggregation auction [19] with ratio 3.25; the best known ratio 3.12 is attained by the averaging auction [21] .
Fiat et al. [10] formulated the prior-free analysis framework for digital goods auctions. The framework was further developed to general symmetric auction problems and connected with the Bayesian framework in [20] . The relation between envy-freedom and prior-free mechanism design was further investigated in [18] . Aggarwal et al. [1] showed that every randomized auction in the digital goods environment can be derandomized in polynomial time with an extra additive error that depends on the maximal range of values.
Leonardi and Roughgarden [22] introduced another benchmark, namely monotone-price benchmark M (2) . Later it was shown in [5] that digital goods auctions have a constant competitive ratio with respect to M (2) .
A number of variants of digital goods auctions have been investigated, including, e.g., online auctions [4, 7] , limited supply (k-unit auctions) [8] , online auctions with unknown limited supply [23] , externalities between bidders [16] , and matroid permutations and position environments [18] .
PRELIMINARIES
In a digital goods auction, an auctioneer sells multiple copies of an item in unlimited supply to n bidders. Each bidder i is interested in a single unit of the item and values it at a privately known value vi. We consider a single-round auction, where each bidder submits a sealed bid bi to the auctioneer. Upon receiving submitted bids b = (b1, . . . , bn) from all bidders, the auctioneer decides on whether each bidder i receives an item and the amount that i pays. If bidder i wins an item, his utility is the difference between his value vi and his payment; otherwise, the bidder pays 0 and his utility is 0. The auctioneer's revenue is the total payment of the bidders.
We assume that all bidders are self-motivated and aim to maximize their own utility. We say that an auction is truthful or incentive compatible if it is a dominant strategy for every bidder i to submit his private value, i.e., bi = vi, no matter how other bidders behave. A randomized auction is (universally) truthful if it is randomly distributed over deterministic truthful auctions.
An auction is called bid-independent if, for each bidder i, the auctioneer computes a threshold price pi according to the bids of the rest n−1 bidders b-i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, ?, bi+1, . . . , bn). In other words, there is a function gi such that pi = gi(b-i). It was shown in [15] that an auction is truthful if and only if it is bid-independent. Thus, it is sufficient to consider bidindependent auctions in order to design truthful auctions.
To evaluate the performance of an auction, we need to have a reasonable benchmark function f : R n → R, where f (b) measures our target revenue for the bid vector b. Given a benchmark function f (·), we say that an auction A has a competitive ratio of λ with respect to f (·) if
is the expected revenue of auction A on the bid vector b. The focus of our paper is to design truthful auctions that minimize the competitive ratio with respect to different benchmarks. In this paper, we assume that a benchmark function f (·) is non-negative and monotone. These are natural conditions for a function to serve as a reasonable benchmark. Specifically, we will focus on the following benchmark functions. (Given a bid vector b = (b1, . . . , bn) we reorder bids so that b (1) 
. That is, F (2) gives the largest possible revenue obtained in a fixed price auction given that there are at least two winners. F (2) was denoted sometimes as F (2) in the previous literature and provides the optimal envy-free revenue conditioned on that at least two bidders receive the item.
• maxV(b) = max 1≤k<n k · b (k+1) . We note that k · b (k+1) is the revenue of the k-item Vickrey auction with a fixed supply of k items. Hence, maxV gives the largest revenue obtained in the Vickrey auction for selling k items for all possible values of the limited supply k.
Theorem 1 (Goldberg et al. [13] ). The competitive ratio with respect to F (2) of any truthful randomized auction is at least
.
We note that λ2 = 2, λ3 = 13/6, and {λn} ∞ n=1 is an increasing sequence with a limit of 2.42 when n approaches infinity. In the proof of the above theorem, the authors of [13] constructed a so-called equal revenue distribution where all values vi are drawn identically and independently with probability Pr[vi > x] = 1
x for any x ≥ 1. A remarkable property of this distribution is that any truthful auction has the same expected revenue n. It was shown that the expected value of F (2) (v) is n × λn. Thus, the theorem follows since
CHARACTERIZATION OF BENCHMARKS
We introduce the following central definition for a Benchmark function.
Definition 1 (Attainability).
A benchmark function f (·) is λ-attainable if there exists a truthful auction that has a competitive ratio of λ with respect to f (·).
We shall give a sufficient and necessary condition of attainability of a benchmark in this section with a set of inequalities which only involves the function f and ratio λ but not any auction. After having the characterization, we analyze the attainability of two well-studied benchmarks in the next section.
For technical simplicity, we consider a discrete and bounded domain for all bids: for any bidder i, we assume that bi ∈ {
(1 + δ) t | t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N } , where δ > 0 is any fixed small constant. Thus, all bids are between 1 and (1 + δ) N , and are multiples of 1 + δ. Let
denote the support of a single bidder's bids and Λ n denote the support of bid vectors of all n bidders. We note that such a multiplicative discretization is not critical for our characterization. (Alternatively, we may consider an additive discretization with bids being integer multiples of δ.)
We will discuss how to generalize our analysis to continuous and unbounded domains at the end of this section. For the domain Λ n we assume without loss of generality that for any b-i, the price offered to bidder i is also from Λ, which is of the form (1 + δ) t . For b-i ∈ Λ n−1 and pi ∈ Λ, let zi(b-i, pi) denote the probability that the auctioneer offers price pi to bidder i when observing others' bids b-i. There exists a truthful auction that is λ-competitive with respect to the benchmark f (·) if and only if the following linear system is feasible:
Note that the summation over pi in LS1 is taken in the domain Λ = { (1 + δ) t | t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N } . We remark that the correspondence between {zi(b-i, pi)}i and truthful auctions is not one-to-one but one-to-many. For any auction, there is a corresponding probability profile {zi(b-i, pi)}i that satisfies LS1. On the other hand, different auctions may have the same probability profile {zi(b-i, pi)}i (thus, they have the same expected revenue). Note that for any given {zi(b-i, pi)}i, we can construct at least one corresponding truthful auction, which independently offers the threshold price pi to each bidder i with probability zi(b-i, pi).
We define
Intuitively, xi(b) gives the expected revenue obtained from bidder i when the bid vector is b. We further define
We note that w(·) can be viewed as a equal revenue distribution over Λ, which satisfies the following nice property:
. Given these definitions, the aforementioned linear system LS1 can be rewritten as follows.
LS2
:
The third constraint in LS2 requires monotonicity of xi(·), which is a necessary condition for the equivalence of the two linear systems.
) must be non-negative, where xi(b-i, 1 1+δ ) = 0. To summarize, we have the following claim.
Proposition 1.
A monotone function f is λ-attainable if and only if the linear system LS2 has a feasible solution
For any set S ⊆ Λ n , let S ↓ i denote the projections of S along the i-th coordinate. Formally,
For a non-negative and monotone function f , we have the following characterization.
Theorem 2. Over a domain Λ, a non-negative and monotone function f is λ-attainable if and only if for any upward
Proof. Only if (necessity). If f (·) is λ-attainable, then there exists a solution xi(b-i, bi) which satisfies all constraints in LS2. Thus,
If (sufficiency). Our goal is to find a feasible solution x = {xi(b)} i,b to the above linear system LS2, given the system of inequalities (2) . Our proof is constructive: we provide a procedure of continuously increasing {xi(b)} i,b , starting from 0, to a point where all constraints of LS2 are satisfied. In order to do that, we write a slightly more general linear system of the following form.
LS3
The only difference between LS2 and LS3 is gi(b-i) in the second constraint. Intuitively, gi(b-i) represents a total mass along direction i at the point b-i. Initially, gi(b-i) = 1, for all i and b-i, and in which case, the two linear systems LS2 and LS3 are identical. We will however decrease the values of gi(b-i)'s in the process of the proof while maintaining the following condition, derived from (2), for all upward closed
Let Γ be the collection of upward closed sets for which the above inequality (3) is tight. It turns out that Γ has a nice structure summarized in the following claim. Claim 1. If S1, S2 ∈ Γ, then S1 ∪ S2, S1 ∩ S2 ∈ Γ.
The high-level idea of our proof is to continuously increase {xi(b)} i,b , starting from 0, to a point where all constraints of LS2 are satisfied. To implement the idea, we identify two special sets S0 and S1, where S0 S1, and a special set Ti ⊆ S0 ↓ i \ S1 ↓ i for a specific coordinate i. Then for each b-i ∈ Ti, we find a threshold point ci(b-i) and increase xi(b-i, b) by ε for all b ≥ ci(b-i). (In the proof, ci(b-i) turns out to be the boundary of S0.) However, in the process, instead of increasing xi's, we decrease the values of f (·) and gi(·) to simplify our analysis (thus, the values of xi's do not change):
to have an equivalent effect on the first constraint of LS3; further, we subtract ε c i (b -i ) from gi(b-i) to balance the update of xi's in the second constraint of LS3. The process continues until all f (·)'s become 0, from which point we get an equivalent solution {xi(b)} i,b to the original problem. We next describe the formal proof.
be the support of f (·). Since f (·) is a monotone function, we know that R is an upward closed set. If R = ∅, then we are done; thus, we assume that R ̸ = ∅. For any S ∈ Γ, the following chain of inequalities
is in fact an equality. Hence, the above two inequalities are tight and S ∩ R ∈ Γ. Hence, in the following, we will only consider those tight sets in Γ that are contained in R. Let S0 = R. We will maintain a chain of upward closed sets S1, . . . , Sm ∈ Γ with the following structure:
During our process, we preserve the following key properties ( †):
Invariant properties ( †) 1. Inequality (3) holds for all upward closed sets.
2. All sets S1, . . . , Sm in the chain R = S0 S1 S2 · · · Sm = ∅ remain tight.
3. f (·) is nonnegative and monotonically increasing.
gi(b-i)
is nonnegative and monotonically decreasing on (Sj−1) ↓ i \ Sj ↓ i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
We note that all these properties hold at the beginning of the process (e.g., we may simply choose m = 1 and Sm = ∅). Since R S1, we have ∑
Since R satisfies condition (3) and S1 ∈ Γ, we have ∑
Thus, we can find i and b-i such that b-i ∈ R ↓ i \ S1 ↓ i and gi(b-i) > 0. From now on to the end of the proof, for notational simplicity we use i to denote this particular index rather than a generic one. Let
Note that Ti ̸ = ∅. For each b-i ∈ Ti we consider the smallest ci(b-i) ∈ Λ such that f (b-i, ci(b-i)) ̸ = 0. We note that ci(b-i) is well defined for each b-i ∈ Ti since Ti ⊂ R ↓ i . For the fixed index i, we intend to update x as follows:
for some fixed ε > 0. In our process, instead of increasing x we decrease the values of f (·) and gi(·) as follows:
The decrements are with respect to the fixed index i only 1 and are implemented by continuously increasing ε from 0 until the value of one of f (b) and gi(b-i) drops down to 0, or one more inequality (3) becomes tight for a new upward closed set. Before describing how to proceed with the process, we establish some observations for the above updates (♢). Their proofs can be found in the full version of the paper.
Claim 2. For any ε and upward closed set S ⊆ S1, the two sides of the inequality (3) for S remain unchanged. In particular, the inequality is still tight for all sets S1, . . . , Sm in the chain R = S0 S1 S2 · · · Sm = ∅.
Claim 3. For any upward closed set S ⊃ R \ S1 and ε, the condition (3) is still satisfied. Claim 5. The function gi(·) remains monotonically decreasing on (Sj−1) ↓ i \ Sj ↓ i for each set Sj in the chain R = S0 S1 S2 · · · Sm = ∅.
Combining Claim 2, 3, 4 and 5 together, we conclude that after update (♢) the aforementioned four key properties ( †) still hold. Thus, we continuously increase ε until a threshold point when one of the three boundary conditions (i.e., f (·) = 0, gi(·) = 0, or inequality (3) becomes tight for a new set) becomes tight, which forbids us from further increasing ε. If more than one conditions become tight simultaneously, we consider them according to the following order.
• At a new point f (·) becomes 0. We then redefine set R = {b | f (b) > 0}. Note that by Claim 4, R remains to be an upward closed set. Further, we let Si ← Si ∩R for all sets in the chain R = S0 S1 S2 · · · Sm = ∅. (If some of the sets become the same, we contract the chain into a shorter one. With respect to this refined chain, gi(·) is still monotonically decreasing on each (Sj−1) ↓ i \ Sj ↓ i .) Then we start over the whole process unless R = ∅, in which case the process terminates.
• At a new point gi(·) becomes 0. We start over by finding a new index i and set Ti for inequality (4) .
(The set R and the chain remain the same.)
• There is a new upward closed set, say S ′ ⊂ Λ n , for which inequality (3) becomes tight. Similarly, we assume without loss of generality that S ′ ⊂ R. First, S ′ cannot contain R \ S1 due to Claim 3. Second, S1 cannot contain S ′ due to Claim 2. By Claim 1, we know that S * S ′ ∪ S1 is also an upward closed tight set. We observe that S * = S ′ ∪ S1 S1 and R = S0 S * . Thus, we can plug S * into the sequence R = S0 S * S1 S2 · · · Sm = ∅.
Since gi(·) is a monotonically decreasing function on set S0 ↓ i \S1 ↓ i , it is a monotonically decreasing function on both S0 ↓ i \S * ↓ i and S * ↓ i \S1 ↓ i . All the inequalities (3) and conditions in (♢) continue to hold with respect to this new chain; hence, we can start over the whole process.
In each step of the update, we either increase the length of the tight set chain or decrease the support of f (·) or gi(·). Thus, the process will eventually terminate as there are only finitely many b ∈ Λ n and finitely many upward closed sets. We note that if there is b ∈ Λ n with f (b) ̸ = 0, then not all gi(·)'s can become 0, because otherwise (3) would be violated for S = Λ n . Therefore, the process must terminate when f (b) = 0 for every b ∈ Λ n . Therefore, the respective sequence of updates of {xi(b)} i,b is a feasible solution to LS2. Indeed, we have checked that the first and second constraints in LS2 are satisfied. The third and forth constraints hold true, because in every update (♢) we may only increase xi(b), and for each fixed b-i we increase xi(b-i, b) monotonically in b. Hence, the benchmark function f (·) is attainable.
We further have the following claim, which will be used in the next section to prove that F (2) is attainable.
Claim 6. If f (·) is a symmetric monotone function (i.e., f (b) is invariant under permutations of coordinates in b), then it is sufficient to verify inequality (2) only for all symmetric upward closed sets for f (·) to be attainable.
Unbounded and Continuous Domains
Our above analysis works for the discrete and bounded domain where all bids are in the set Λ = { (1 + δ) t | t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N } . Our analysis continues to hold when N = ∞. Indeed, the argument for the necessity part of Theorem 2 for N = ∞ works in exactly the same way as the finite and bounded case. For the sufficiency part, we apply a standard argument from measure theory and mathematical analysis as follows.
For the unbounded domain, if inequality (2) in the characterization theorem holds true for all upward closed sets, then every finite version of LS2 must have a feasible solution x N for every finite size N of the support Λ(N ) = {1, 1 + δ, . . . , (1 + δ) N }, where all outside densities are accumulated at the boundary of Λ(N ). We consider a corresponding feasible solution z N = {zi(b)} i,b to LS1 for each Λ(N ). We treat the price distribution zi(b-i) for each bidder i as a measure defined on the σ-algebra generated by the sets {[1, 1 + δ) , . . . , [(1 + δ) N , ∞)} n . Every solution z N to LS1 is a vector of n measures zi(b), of which we altogether further regard as a measure defined on the σ-algebra σN generated by the sets {[1, 1 + δ) , . . . ,
In a few steps below we show how to construct a measure z * that generates a feasible solution of LS1 on every σ-algebra σN for every N .
1. We notice that for any N2 > N1, every solution zN 2 to LS1 for N2 is also a solution of LS1 for N1. Indeed, as a solution of LS1 for N1 we may just use the same measure zN 2 on a smaller σ-algebra σN 1 .
2. We observe that the set of all feasible solutions zN to LS1 for any fixed N is a compact set (bounded and closed). We recall that one of the definitions of a compact set says that every infinite sequence z N (N = 1, 2, . . .) of points in a compact C must contain an infinite subsequence z N (j) (j = 1, 2, . . .) that converges to a point z N ∈ C.
3. For every fixed N = ℓ, we consider a sequence of solutions z k to LS1 for each k = ℓ, ℓ + 1, . . . . For each z k we get a feasible solution z k | ℓ to LS1 for N = ℓ. Further, since the set of the solutions to LS1 for N = ℓ is a compact set, we may choose an infinite subsequence that converges to z ℓ .
4. We note that by our construction, the measure z ℓ can be extended to a feasible solution of LS1 for every k ≥ ℓ, i.e., we can find a feasible solutionẑ k to LS1 for N = k such that as a measure z ℓ =ẑ k | ℓ . Indeed, we can take the infinite sequence {N (j)} for which z N (j) | ℓ → z ℓ and consider another infinite sequence of measures z N (j) | k . Within the latter sequence we can choose an infinite subsequence converging to a feasible solutionẑ k of LS1 for N = k (note thatẑ k | ℓ = z ℓ ).
5.
In fact, when constructing each z ℓ we can ensure that z ℓ |j = zj for every j ≤ ℓ.
6. Finally, we may define our measure z * on the unbounded domain Λ as a limit of z ℓ , where ℓ → ∞.
In a similar way by taking δ → 0, we can extend Theorem 2 to the case of continuous support. Hence, in the continuous and unbounded domain, the sufficient and necessary condition (2) in Theorem 2 translates into the following.
Theorem 3. A monotone function f (·) is λ-attainable if and only if for any measurable upward closed set
where
F (2) IS ATTAINABLE
We show in this section that F (2) is λn-attainable, for λn being the number conjectured in [14] . 
For the sake of notational convenience, we employ Fn(b) to denote F (2) (b) when the input vector b contains n bids. We let Λ = [1, +∞) and Λ n = R n ≥1 denote the support of bid vectors. Our proof is by induction on n. The base case n = 2 is trivial (where λ2 = 2 and F2(·) is 2-attainable given by the Vickrey auction). We assume that for all k ≤ n, each F k (·) is λ k -attainable. In the rest of this section, we show that Fn+1(·) is λn+1-attainable. For the equal revenue distribution with density w(·), it was shown in [13] that
We note that 1 = ∫ ∞ 1 w(t) dt and, therefore, we have ∫
Comparing to the inequality (5) in Theorem 3, we have the following claim.
Claim 7. For k = 2, . . . , n, each λ k is chosen so that inequality (5) is tight for the set Λ k .
Let Gn(z) = Fn+1(1, z) , ∀z ∈ Λ n .
By the following claim, to prove that
Given the above claim, we now show that Gn(z) behaves similarly as Fn+1(b) in (6) (the proofs are deferred to the full version of the paper).
Claim 9. The set Λ n is tight for the benchmark Gn(z) and competitive ratio λn+1 in (2), i.e., ∫ Λ n Gn(z) · w(z) dz = λn+1 · n.
Let
We observe that Gn(z) = Fn+1(1, z) = max(n + 1, Fn(z)) for z ∈ Λ n ; thus, Gn(z) = Fn(z) + Hn(z). We note that due to the induction hypothesis, Fn(z) is λn-attainable. This means that for every symmetric upward closed set S ⊂ Λ n , we have ∫
We show in Claim 10 below that for every symmetric up-
If we combine the above two inequalities, then we get for every symmetric upward closed set S ⊂ Λ n , ∫
We observe that Fn(·), Gn(·) and Hn(·) all are symmetric functions. By Theorem 6, we know that Gn(z) is λn+1attainable. Hence, we are only left to prove the following Claim 10 in order to show λn+1-attainability of Fn+1(b) and complete the proof of Theorem 4.
Claim 10. For every symmetric upward closed set S ⊂
Proof. Since S is a symmetric set, all projections S ↓ i are in fact equal to the same set, denoted by X ⊂ Λ n−1 . We notice that S can be divided into n (almost) disjoint sets S = S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sn, where each Si
} and max(z-i) denotes the largest value of all coordinates of z-i. Furthermore, note that for any zi ∈ [max(z-i), ∞), the value of the benchmark Fn(z-i, zi) is fixed; thus, the value of Hn(z-i, zi) is also fixed. Hence, we have the following equalities.
By Claim 9, we know that ∫
Further, equality (7) says ∫
That is, Λ n is a tight set for (8) . This implies that
Hn(z-n, max(z-n)) max(z-n) w(z-n) dz-n
Therefore,
Combining (9) and (11), we are left to show that ∫ X Hn(z-n, max(z-n)) max(z-n)
Since Hn(z) is a non-negative monotonically decreasing function, the function H ′ (z-n)
is also nonnegative monotonically decreasing. Let 1X (z-n) denote the characteristic function of the set X. Note that 1X (·) is a non-negative monotonically increasing function. Now the inequality (12) simply reads as ∫
The last inequality for an arbitrary non-negative monotonically increasing function (in our case it is 1X (·)), an arbitrary non-negative monotonically decreasing function (in our case it is H ′ (·)), and an arbitrary product measure (in our case it is w(z-i)) is known as a special case of Fortuin-Kasteleyn-Ginibre (FKG) inequality [11] (in the uni-variate case this inequality is called Chebyshev Integral inequality). Therefore, the inequality holds and the claim follows.
K-ITEM VICKREY AUCTION
In this section, we consider the benchmark maxV(b) = max 1≤k<n k · b k+1 provided by the largest revenue of the k-item Vickrey auction across all possible values of supply k.
First of all, we calculate the lower bound on the competitive ratio for maxV(·) using similar approach as in [13] . We employ equal revenue distribution B of bid vectors, that is i.i.d. with the density function w(b) = 1 b 2 , cumulative density 1 − 1 b , and the support [1, ∞) . The key technical problem is to compute the expected value of the benchmark maxV(B). Following [13] , we compute the probability Pr[maxV(B) ≥ z] for any given z. Since maxV(B) is at least n − 1, we only need to compute the probability for z ≥ n − 1. Let a random variable Vi be the i-th largest bid in B. We further define a set of random variables as
We note that so far we follow the idea of [13] , but adjust definitions accordingly to the benchmark maxV(·). Intuitively, F n,k captures the value of maxV(·) given k additional bid-ders with bid V1. Let Hi denote the event
The probability of Hi can be written as
Since Hi's are mutually exclusive and the event F n,k ≥ z is the union of Hi for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, we get
This gives a recursive relation for Pr[F n,k ≥ z] and the boundary condition is Pr[F 0,k ≥ z] = 0. By induction, we can prove that
Therefore, we have
Now we can get the expectation by the following calculation.
Thus, we get a lower bound on the competitive ratio for maxV(·)
where the denominator is n, as the expected revenue of any auction is at most n on the equal revenue distribution. Finally, we note that γn approaches e − 1 as n goes to infinity.
On the other hand, we can show that maxV(·) is γnattainable by our characterization theorem. The proof is almost identically to our argument for F (2) in the previous section. We only replace λn by γn, F (2) (·) by maxV(·), and Hn(z) = max ( 0, n + 1 − Fn(z) ) by Hn(z) = max ( 0, n −
Fn(z)
) . In the argument for F (2) , we do not use any explicit formula for F (2) , but employ a few properties such as monotonicity, symmetry, linearity, and the fact that the function value does not change if one increases the largest bid. These properties continue to hold for the benchmark maxV(·). The definition of Hn(z) = max
is the only place where we use the formula for F (2) , which is replaced by Hn(z) = max ( 0, n − Fn(z) ) for maxV(·). Note that the properties that we use are that Hn(z) is decreasing and does not change if one increases the largest bid, which continue to hold for the modified Hn(z). Therefore, the whole proof of the attainability of F (2) carries over to the benchmark maxV(·).
We summarize our results in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For the benchmark maxV(·) and any n ≥ 2, the optimal competitive ratio of a truthful auction is γn = ( n n−1 ) n−1 − 1.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our paper studies designing optimal competitive digital goods auctions. The proof of the characterization theorem gives an explicit procedure that constructs an auction with the optimal competitive ratio. The construction, however, is rather abstract and may take exponential steps for some benchmarks. It is therefore an intriguing question to see if there is any simple form for the description of optimal auctions (with respect to, e.g., the F (2) benchmark).
We remark that our characterization applies not only to symmetric benchmarks such as F (2) but also non-symmetric benchmarks. In particular, Theorem 2 may better estimate the competitive ratio of the monotone-price benchmark M (2) of Leonardi and Roughgarden [22] .
Note that the characterization that we have addressed in Theorem 2 is fundamental to our understanding and discovery of the optimal competitive ratios. The next step is to identify more general settings for which such characterizations exists. A deeper understanding of the result could potentially lead to an answer to the following more general question: For what class of prior free auction design problems the performance of the optimal auction with respect to a given benchmark exactly matches the expected performance of an optimal auction tailored to the worst case distribution under that benchmark? That is, what are the essential features of a problem to guarantee that there is no duality gap between the problem of designing an optimal auction and the problem of computing a worst case distribution? A fundamental question in prior free auction design (and perhaps also in online algorithm design) is to identify the class of problems for which such strong duality holds.
All our discussions in this paper are only for the unlimited supply case. However, our results to some extent carry over to the limited supply setting. In a limited supply setting, let k be the number of units for sale and n > k be the number of bidders. Let f : R n → R be any non-negative and monotone benchmark. We define f1(b1, . . . , b k ) = f (b1, . . . , b k−1 , b k , b k , . . . , b k ) and f2(b1, . . . , b k ) = f (b1, . . . , b k−1 , b k , 0, . . . , 0), for each b = (b1, . . . , bn) with b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn. That is, we 'increase' and 'decrease' in f (·) the last n − k bids to b k and 0, respectively. We have f1(b1, . . . , bn) ≥ f (b1, . . . , bn) ≥ f2(b1, . . . , bn) for any b due to the monotonicity condition. We note that f1(·) and f2(·) only depend on the highest k bids and may be viewed as two other benchmarks. Now we may find the optimal competitive ratios of unlimited supply auctions with k bidders for both benchmarks f1(·) and f2(·) with the help of Theorem 2. We note that the competitive ratios for the f1(·) and f2(·) benchmarks give upper and lower bounds, respectively, on the competitive ratio of k-unit auctions with respect to the benchmark f (·). Indeed, we may construct the following limited supply auction: given a vector of bids b = (b1, . . . , bn) with b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn, we admit only the k highest bids and then run the optimal competitive auction with respect to the f1(·) benchmark. We note that the revenue of such an auction can only be higher than the respective revenue of the unlimited supply auction for f1(·).
We observe that if f (·) only depends on the k highest bids, then f (·) = f1(·) = f2(·) and their respective competitive ratios are the same. This is the case for the benchmark F (2,k) , considered previously in [19, 14] and defined as the optimal omniscient fixed price auction that sells between 2 and k items. Therefore, without much work we obtain optimal competitive k-unit auctions with respect to the benchmark f (·). We note that for other benchmark functions, the question of designing optimal competitive k-unit auctions remains open; we leave this interesting question for the future work.
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